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Abstract  
This study examines the informativeness and credibility of independent directors’ stated reasons 
for resignation. Directors are privy to private information about the firm, and therefore may 
resign in anticipation of future underperformance to limit potential reputation damage. We posit 
that directors have an economic incentive not to disclose the true reason for their resignation in 
order to protect their existing equity ownership, business relationships, and future directorship 
opportunities. Consistent with these conjectures, we find that the likelihood of resignation 
increases with reputation and weak future performance. Moreover, resignations lacking 
unambiguous or verifiable reasons are associated with poor recent and future financial and 
operating performance. Investors and analysts appear to partially understand and respond to such 
misrepresentations, as evidenced by an immediate negative and economically significant market 
reaction and downward forecast revisions. Complementary factors such as positive concurrent 
operating results and richer information environment somewhat mitigate the negative reaction. 
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I. Introduction  
 
This study examines the informativeness and credibility of independent directors’ 
cited reasons for resignation. The importance of independent directors has increased in 
recent years, particularly from the perspective of regulators, as evidenced by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) requirement that audit committees be composed entirely of 
independent directors. This increased importance is also seen in the listing standards of 
U.S. exchanges, which require boards to have a majority of independent directors. These 
requirements stem from the perceived advantages of appointing independent directors as 
monitors and advisers to management: independent directors are assumed to be less 
beholden to the firm and/or the CEO, and to add expertise and new perspectives to boards 
that might otherwise lack diversity.1 Notwithstanding, there is growing evidence that 
independent directors—who are supposed to represent the interests of shareholders and 
maximize shareholder value—often act in ways that maximize their own utility at the 
expense of shareholders. For example, independent directors may support generous 
compensation packages to managers for personal reasons such as a desire to be reelected 
to the board or to enhance their business relationship with the firm (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2006). In addition, independent directors are likely to resign following poor firm 
performance, possibly to avoid the workload associated with restructuring the firm’s 
operations (Yermack, 2004); or in anticipation of poor forthcoming performance, at a 
critical time when advisers are most needed (Gupta and Fields, 2009; Asthana and 
Balsam, 2009; Fahlenbrach et al., 2010).  
We extend this line of research by examining the circumstances surrounding 
independent directors’ departures and the informativeness and credibility of the reasons 
cited for resignation, particularly where it might be related to concerns about the future 
performance of the firm. We use the terms ‘resignation’ and ‘departure’ interchangeably 
                                                 
1 There is mixed empirical evidence on independent directors’ impact on firm performance. Rosenstein and 
Wyatt (1990) find a positive market reaction to the nomination of independent directors to the board. Core 
et al. (1999) document a positive association between the fraction of independent directors and the market-
to-book ratio. Nguyen and Nielsen (2009) find a negative market reaction to the sudden death of an 
independent director. In contrast, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Klein 
(1998), and Bhagat and Black (1997, 2002) provide evidence that there is no positive association between 
firm value and independent directors. 
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to cover both resignation and refusal to stand for reelection, consistent with SEC filing 
guidelines.2 Given directors’ central role in monitoring and advising management, as well 
as the cost and benefit of directorship, the motive for departure is important information 
for investors. This information allows shareholders to react in a timely manner. The SEC 
supports this view, stating“…the Commission noted that disclosures concerning the 
resignation of a director may be of similar importance [as changes in independent 
accountants – the authors] in bringing to light disagreements or difficulties concerning 
management policies or practices that may be material to an investment decision with 
regard to the registrant’s securities.” (SEC Release No. 34-26587). With this in mind, 
the SEC put in place director resignation disclosure requirements that depend almost 
exclusively on director discretion.3 However, director fiduciary duty—to disclose fully 
and fairly all material information when shareholder action is required, as well as under 
the duties of care, loyalty and good faith—is in conflict with director incentives because 
disclosure of non-benign reasons for the resignation could entail direct and indirect costs 
for the company and the director. Hence, the purpose of this study is to examine the 
incentives for resignation as well as the information content of the provided reason (or 
lack thereof) for the resignation.  
Directorships bring many benefits to the individual in terms of business 
connections, reputation and compensation (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Yermack, 2004; Perry, 2000; Linn and Park, 2005). A resignation signals that the 
‘cost’ of serving on a board exceeds the benefits. The cost includes primarily the time 
commitment and the risk to the director’s reputation; the latter being the most significant 
(Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Masulis and Mobbs, 2014). Directors who are 
privy to inside information about the firm may resign when they anticipate future 
underperformance in order to limit potential damage to their reputation (Gupta and 
                                                 
2 SEC Form 8-K, Item 5.02 (a)(1): “If a director has resigned or refuses to stand for re-election to the board 
of directors” 
3 Putting tremendous power in the hands of directors, firms must specify their reason when reporting 
director resignations on Form 8-K only if the departing director provided any such reason. Thus, directors 
exclusively control whether and what reason is disclosed. However, since 2004, it has been sufficient that 
the resignation is known to an officer of the company to be because of a disagreement on any matter 
relating to the firm’s operations, policies or practices—to force the company to disclose this fact and 
related information. The window to report such departures has been significantly shortened over the last 
several decades from fifteen to five and currently four business days.   
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Fields, 2009; Asthana and Balsam, 2009; Fahlenbrach et al., 2010). While the evidence in 
the literature is consistent with greater likelihood of director resignation both following 
and in anticipation of weak operating and financial performance, it does not allow us to 
determine whether reputation concerns actually lead to the decision to resign when 
directors anticipate poor future performance.  
Our first set of analyses shows that the likelihood of departures increases 
unconditionally with reputation concerns and past negative profitability. In addition, our 
results indicate that director departures are motivated by the preservation of reputational 
capital in anticipation of poor firm performance. These results support the conjecture that 
reputation concerns affect directors’ resignation decisions, especially when they 
anticipate poor future performance. 
Regardless of reputation, departing directors have an incentive to disguise the true 
reason for their departure when their resignation is due to concerns about future 
performance. Attributing the departure to concerns about future performance or citing 
‘disagreement’ with management relating to the company’s operations, policies or 
practices would have no apparent benefit for the departing director. First, conveying the 
true reason for the departure would likely trigger an immediate negative market reaction 
(Agrawal and Chen, 2009; Dewally and Peck, 2009), which would adversely affect the 
financial position of the departing director, as well as that of management and the 
remaining directors. Second, it would likely increase public scrutiny of both the board 
and management, and might open the door to shareholder intervention and even 
litigation—consequences that could undermine the departing director’s relationship with 
management and the remaining directors. Indeed, dissenting directors experience a 
decline in the number of board appointments they are offered in the future (Marshall, 
2010). Hence, directors have incentive to disguise the true motive for resignation by 
citing benign or ambiguous motives such as ‘time constraints’ and ‘personal reasons’, or 
by not providing an explanation at all.  
To facilitate a comprehensive analysis of the resignation announcements and their 
informativeness, we use data from Audit Analytics to identify all resignation cases from 
2004 through 2012. We group the reasons for departure into four mutually exclusive 
categories. The first category, ‘Disagreement’, includes all resignations where the outside 
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director specifically cites (or the company is aware of) a disagreement with management 
on a matter relating to the company’s operations, policies or practices. It thus includes 
cases where the resignation provides a strong signal that the director has concerns about 
the future performance of the firm.4 In some of the analyses we include in this category a 
handful of cases (five in our sample period) of ‘Investigations’, where the reason cited for 
departure is the launch or existence of a formal investigation of the director (for example 
by the SEC, and normally unrelated to the directorship).5 The second category, 
accounting for over 60% of the sample, is ‘No Reason’. The third category is ‘Outside 
Commitments’. The fourth is ‘Personal’, where the stated reason for departure is related 
to family, health, retirement or other personal concerns.6 Appendix A shows typical 8-K 
reports with different categories of resignation. 
Our examination of resignation announcement returns reveals a negative and 
economically significant reaction not only to the Disagreement and Investigation 
categories but also to the more ambiguous and unverifiable categories of No Reason and 
Outside Commitments. Furthermore, returns in the year prior to the No Reason and 
Outside Commitments departure categories are negative and economically significant, as 
are returns in the following year. A similar picture emerges when we examine past and 
future operating performance surrounding these ambiguous departures, indicating weak 
operating performance preceding as well as following these seemingly benign departure 
categories.  
 We further investigate the issue of seemingly benign motives by re-partitioning 
the reasons cited for departures into two groups based on the perceived reliability and 
verifiability of the reason cited (Mercer, 2004; Hutton et al., 2003). We examine all 
relevant director departure 8-K filings to determine the credibility of the stated motive. 
                                                 
4 It is conceivable that some resignations with disagreement may not be entirely attributed to concerns 
about future performance, but rather may be related to personal differences with the CEO or to past and 
present events. Nevertheless, this category is the most likely to explicitly include resignation cases due to 
performance concerns.   
5 We combine these five cases into one category with disagreements for ease of presentation, due to their 
small number and because they are similarly verifiable and likely negative reasons. However, 
investigations are first and foremost indicative of potential wrongdoing by the director, not the firm, and 
thus we also conduct the analysis excluding these five cases (untabulated). Results remain the same. 
6 Arguably there is not much difference between Outside Commitments and Personal. We opt to treat them 
separately because of the large portion of cases where the director specifically indicates “outside 
commitment” as the reason for departure. 
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The ‘verifiable’ group includes Health—which is verifiable and likely to hinder existing 
and additional employment options, and therefore unlikely to be used opportunistically; 
Retirement (at the age of 69 or older, or due to firm’s mandatory retirement policy)—a 
verifiable and transparent reason; Disagreement and Investigation departures that are 
accompanied by company disclosures detailing the reasons; and a subset of Outside 
Commitments and Personal reasons—only where details about commitments and 
personal circumstances are explicitly revealed. The ‘non-verifiable’ group includes No 
Reason, voluntary Retirement, Outside Commitments and Personal reasons where no 
additional information about outside activities and personal circumstances is disclosed, 
and hence the motive is undefined and less credible. 
We find that resignations where an ambiguous or unverifiable reason is cited, or 
where no reason is provided (i.e., the non-verifiable group), are preceded as well as 
followed by poor financial and operating performance (equity returns, profitability and 
cash flows in the year preceding and following the resignation date), casting serious 
doubt on the true motivation for departure and on the reliability of the explanation given. 
Furthermore, investors do not appear to be convinced by such seemingly benign 
explanations. We document negative abnormal returns around these resignation 
announcements that are both statistically and economically significant, suggesting that 
independent directors’ resignations send a negative signal to capital markets about future 
firm performance when the departure reason is not verifiable. In contrast, market 
reaction, past and future financial and operating performance are not different from zero 
when the director provides a verifiable and neutral reason for departure.  
As an added measure, we investigate whether and to what extent financial 
analysts—who are presumably adept at information gathering and interpretation—are 
better able to see through the justification provided and translate the implications of the 
departure into tangible forecasts. We find negative analyst forecast revisions following 
ambiguous and unverifiable director departures. These findings provide additional 
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support for our conjecture that some directors who resign voluntarily do not cite the true 
reason for their departure when it is related to concerns about future performance.7 
The picture that emerges from our analyses implies a potential breach of fiduciary 
duty by some independent directors, with possible collusion or tacit agreement on the part 
of firms in avoiding honest disclosure of the details surrounding the departure.8 Indeed, 
the perceived advantages of appointing outside ‘independent’ directors as monitors and 
advisers to management seem to take a back seat to some directors’ personal incentives, 
reputational capital and self-preservation. Moreover, the implications may extend beyond 
the mere omission or concealment of a director’s concerns about the business; their 
governance role in monitoring and advising management could potentially be feeble and 
‘off the record’. These findings may help to explain the conflicting evidence found in 
prior research regarding the benefits of director independence.  
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, to our knowledge it 
is the first to comprehensively and systematically examine the reasons cited for 
resignations by independent directors. Second, we present evidence that directors are 
likely to disguise the true reason for resignation whenever it is related to concerns about 
future performance. This central finding provides additional support to our conjecture 
that independent directors often take actions that maximize their own utility at the direct 
expense of shareholders, especially in the absence of other monitoring mechanisms. 
Third, we show that investors and analysts partially understand and respond to these 
potential misrepresentations. Thus, the SEC’s efforts in revamping disclosure regarding 
director resignation by empowering directors to effectively control the publicized reason 
for resignation as well as by shortening the window for such announcements, has yielded 
mixed results at best; while the more timely filing is helpful for investors and analysts, 
                                                 
7 This is not to imply that all resignations relate to concerns about the future performance of the firm. For 
example, some directors who cite time constraints may provide an honest description of their reason for 
departure. We argue that among those who offer time constraints as a reason for departure, there are cases 
where the departure is actually related to concerns about future performance.  
8 Such interpretation is consistent with evidence of strategic disclosure in 8-K filings documented by Segal 
and Segal (2015). We note that independent directors may be named in securities lawsuits. Brochet and 
Srinivasan (2013) find in their sample that 76% of such directors served throughout the entire class period, 
suggesting that some resignations occurred during the litigated period. We did not find cases where the 
resignation related disclosure itself was a point of contention. 
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the conflict of interests for independent directors has seemingly proven too strong for 
many to make use of the disclosure mechanism in an honest and truthful way. 
 
II. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
2.1 Director Resignations, Performance and Reputation 
When deciding whether to resign, directors trade off the benefits provided by the 
directorship position against the costs of continuing to serve on the board.9 Directorships 
provide several important benefits: business relationships, learning business practices 
from high-quality managers, the opportunity to contribute to society (Lorsch and 
MacIver, 1989) and acquiring reputation as an expert in decision control and 
monitoring—which in turn may help to secure additional board appointments (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983) and compensation. The importance of compensation has increased in the 
past decade as a growing number of directors are compensated by equity-related 
instruments such as stock options and restricted stock, in addition to cash retainers, 
meeting fees, committee fees, insurance and other fringe benefits.10   
While directorships provide substantial benefits, they also entail direct costs in 
terms of time commitment and effort; as well as indirect costs, foremost of which is 
reputation risk (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014). Directors have a strong incentive to maintain 
a good reputation as business monitors since this may help them secure additional board 
seats with accompanying compensation (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Research 
suggests that a director’s reputation is directly affected by the performance of the firm. 
                                                 
9 Our analysis focuses exclusively on the resignation of independent directors. Inside directors are excluded 
because of the different incentives related to the resignation decision and the reasons cited for departure. 
Because they are employed by the firm and are typically part of senior management, inside directors have 
less incentive to resign as they receive most of their compensation and prestige from the company. 
Moreover, the legal risks are considerably higher for inside directors in their capacity as senior executives. 
In contrast, independent directors are typically employed by other firms and hold other directorships, hence 
the personal economic impact of resignation is smaller.  
10 Yermack (2004) estimates that the average annual value of cash retainer and equity-related compensation 
of directors of Fortune 500 companies is around $70,000. Perry (2000) and Linn and Park (2005) calculate 
that the value of the additional array of compensation in the form of meeting fees, committee fees, 
insurance, and other fringe benefits increases the annual compensation by one third. Thus the average 
annual total compensation for Yermack’s sample is around $90,000. In a more recent survey, Pearl Meyer 
and Partners (2002) estimate that director compensation, not including the value of fringe benefits and 
other fees, amounts to $152,000 in the largest 200 companies and $116,000 in the largest 1,000 companies. 
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Individuals hold fewer directorships after serving in companies that experience financial 
distress (Gilson, 1990), that are acquired (Harford, 2003), that perform poorly (Yermack, 
2004), that experience financial statement restatement, especially if the director is a 
member of the audit committee (Srinivasan, 2005), and that are sued for financial fraud 
(Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; Brochet and Srinivasan, 2013).11  
As indicated, an outside director’s resignation signals that the costs associated 
with the position have come to outweigh the benefits. One potential explanation for the 
increase in costs is past underperformance. Directors of underperforming firms may 
resign in order to limit potential damage to their reputation, evade legal liability, or 
escape the workload associated with restructuring the firm’s operations. Alternatively, 
they may resign as a result of pressure from shareholders (Brochet and Srinivasan, 2013). 
Yermack (2004) provides support for this hypothesis, showing that director turnover is 
negatively associated with past equity returns.  
Another explanation for the increase in costs is poor expected future financial 
performance. The effect of past financial performance on reputation is essentially a sunk 
cost because directors have already incurred the damage to their reputation. Unless the 
resignation is forced by shareholders, they have little incentive to resign if they believe 
the worst is over. If the firm’s performance is expected to recover, then the impact of past 
performance on reputation will be mitigated as the improvement occurs. However, even 
if the firm did not underperform in the past but is expected to underperform in the future, 
then directors still have an incentive to resign and thereby avoid potential reputation 
damage. Consistent with this hypothesis, Asthana and Balsam (2009) find that 
independent directors are more likely to resign when they expect the company to run into 
financial difficulties in the future. Similarly, Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) find that firms 
where independent directors resign unexpectedly have poor stock and accounting 
                                                 
11 Another potential indirect cost is the risk of litigation; out-of-pocket liability risk, in particular. However, 
Black et al. (2009) find that incidences of out-of-pocket liability for independent directors are rare. 
Directors’ nominal liability is almost entirely eliminated by a combination of indemnification, insurance, 
procedural rules, and the settlement incentives of plaintiffs, defendants, and insurers. The principal liability 
risk comes from an insolvent company (which can neither pay damages itself nor indemnify the director) 
with one or more very wealthy (hence, worth chasing) directors, where damages exceed the insurance 
policy limits.  
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performance, are more likely to restate earnings, and are more likely to be named in a 
federal class action securities fraud lawsuit in the period subsequent to the resignation.  
While previous research findings suggest that firm performance affects directors’ 
reputation—and that directors are more likely to depart following weak operating 
performance and when the firm is expected to underperform in the future—we conjecture 
that the association between the likelihood of departure and future operating performance 
is moderated by the extent of reputation risk. Specifically, directors with a higher 
reputation to conserve are more likely to depart when expecting (rather than following) 
weak operating performance simply because the penalty in terms of their reputation is 
expected to be greater. Hence, our first set of hypotheses is: 
 
H1a: The likelihood of departure following weak past performance does not 
increase with reputation. 
 
H1b:  The likelihood of departure in anticipation of weak future performance 
increases with reputation. 
 
 
 
2.2 Information Content of Reasons for Departure, or Lack Thereof 
Following the change in 8-K disclosure requirements issued by the SEC in March 
2004, firms are required to immediately report directors’ resignations and to disclose the 
reasons as provided by the departing director.12 If the company is aware that the 
resignation involves disagreement on any matter relating to the company’s operations, 
policies or practices, then the company must explain the nature of the disagreement. One 
can broadly classify the reasons for departure into two categories—(i) resignations for 
personal reasons not related to concerns about future performance, and (ii) cases where 
the director resigns because of concerns about future performance, perhaps in order to 
protect reputation capital. The first category includes departures related to reasons such 
as health concerns, the mandatory retirement age, acceptance of a ministerial position or 
political candidacy. This category therefore covers resignation cases due to verifiable 
                                                 
12 SEC Release No. 34-49424, Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing 
Date. See SEC Release No. 8400 and footnote 3 above for additional details on prior requirements. 
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reasons and hence there is little likelihood that these resignations are associated with 
concerns about future performance.  
When directors resign due to concerns about future profitability, they can signal 
their concerns by disclosing this information as the reason for their resignation; or by 
citing ‘disagreement’ with management, if any exists. 13 This sends a clear warning signal 
about future performance because of issues related to the operations or governance of the 
firm.14 Agrawal and Chen (2009) document a significant negative market reaction to 
resignation announcements citing disagreement, and poor operating and stock 
performance in the 12 months before and after the resignation. Dewally and Peck (2009) 
report a significant number of bankruptcy cases, higher frequency of internal 
management changes, and increased frequency of adoption of defense mechanisms 
against takeover following resignation citing disagreement. In contrast to Agrawal and 
Chen (2009), they observe positive equity returns in the six months following the 
resignation.  
The resignation disclosure requirements are intended to enhance director 
effectiveness by increasing dissenting directors’ leverage (Brown, 2007). However, often 
neither the director nor the company has any incentive to disclose the true underlying 
reason for resignation if it entails concerns about future performance or even 
disagreement with management—because that implies direct and indirect costs for the 
company and the director, with no apparent benefit. Disclosing concerns about future 
performance or disagreement is likely to trigger an economically significant negative 
market reaction which would translate into a direct monetary loss for the departing 
director, management, and remaining directors through their equity ownership, in 
addition to shareholder dissatisfaction. Furthermore, such resignation is likely to attract 
public scrutiny of the company, given the perception that directors may have access to 
information not available to the public at large. Public scrutiny may be costly for 
management and the remaining directors for several reasons. First, management and 
                                                 
13 The filing requirements leave substantial discretion with the departing director with respect to the 
information that would be furnished to investors via an 8-K filing in relation with the departure. Item 5.02 
(a)(2) compels the firm to file as an exhibit any written statement furnished by the director. Item 5.02(a)(3) 
requires the firm to file an amended 8-K if the director disagrees with the original filing. 
14 In our comprehensive sample, out of 5,647 departures of independent directors, none cited concerns 
about future performance as the reason for departure, and only 84 cited disagreement. 
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remaining directors will need to explain the source of director concerns and reasons for 
disagreement, and defend the position that led to the resignation. Second, the additional 
scrutiny may uncover other problems within the company. Third, there may be a negative 
impact on the reputation of management and the board if it is found that the director 
concerns or disagreement had merit. These costs likely deter companies from disclosing 
that a resignation is related to concerns about future performance or disagreement. 
Similarly, departing directors have no incentive to cite concerns about future performance 
or disagreement with management because the above-mentioned costs are likely to 
undermine their relationship with the company and adversely affect their business 
dealings, as well as jeopardize their future directorship appointments (Marshall, 2010).15 
Hence, if a departure is indeed prompted by concerns about future performance, directors 
have an incentive to mask this by providing no reason for the departure, or by providing 
vague notions such as ‘other commitments’ and ‘for personal reasons’.16 Although 
directors have a fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all material information, they 
can use various other reasons to explain the resignation; and it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to prove that the director actually resigned for reasons related to future 
performance.17 Taken together, the incentive not to disclose concerns about future 
                                                 
15 Dewally and Peck (2009) find evidence linking board strength to the director’s decision to publicize 
leaving the board. Arguably, a resignation with disagreement may establish the reputation of the director as 
a more vigilant monitor, as well as distancing the director from a poorly performing firm. However, this 
may be achieved at the expense of future board appointments (for example, where CEOs prefer less vigilant 
directors who will approve excessive CEO compensation. See Bebchuk and Fried (2006) for a 
comprehensive discussion on the issue of directors and CEO compensation). In such instances, directors are 
more likely to ignore the poor performance of the CEO, approve other perquisites and engage in other non-
shareholder value-maximizing activities (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). 
16 Dewally and Peck (2009) conclude that directors who resign claiming they are “too busy” are likely 
truthful and find no evidence of cronyism or attempts to support entrenched management. Nevertheless, 
their investigation comprises a relatively small sample of 52 outside director resignations mentioned in 
press articles, from 1990 to 2003. 
17 The traditional view of the disclosure duty focuses on whether shareholders receive all material 
information required for their actions, and whether it is communicated in a balanced and truthful manner. 
In Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998), the Delaware Supreme Court expanded the disclosure duty, 
stating that directors violate their disclosure duty when they knowingly disseminate false information that 
results in damage to an individual stockholder, even if no action by shareholders is required. Further, 
shareholders have a right to be able to rely upon the truthfulness of all information disseminated to them by 
the directors (Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, 1999). However, independent directors generally face 
limited legal liability because legal procedures are often costly and ineffective, and various mechanisms 
can be used to avoid legal penalties (see Fairfax, 2005, Black et al., 2006, and Brochet and Srinivasan, 
2014 for a comprehensive review of the legal risks faced by independent directors). 
12 
 
performance and the ability to effectively hide those concerns suggest that directors are 
not likely to reveal the true reason for departure when it is motivated by such concerns.  
We examine the information content of the departure disclosure by analyzing the 
association between (i) the stated reason for the resignation and (ii) the reaction of 
investors and analysts to the announcement. We also examine the relation between 
subsequent firm performance and the reasons for the departure. We posit that the reaction 
by investors and analysts to the reported reason for resignation predictably depends on 
the extent to which the reported reason is verifiable or reliable (Mercer, 2004; Hutton et 
al., 2003). Disagreement and Investigation are two clear cases where the reason itself 
conveys negative news, and moreover is unlikely to be misrepresented. Thus, there is no 
tension in these cases and the expectation in both is that the market will respond 
negatively to these reported reasons. This first category is dubbed ‘Verifiable-
Negative’.18 The second category includes verifiable reasons that have no clear 
directional implications for the future performance of the firm (labeled ‘Verifiable-
Neutral’), including resignation for health reasons, mandatory retirement age, and a 
subset of Outside Commitments and Personal reasons where details about these outside 
commitments and personal circumstances are expressly revealed and detailed, thus 
rendering them verifiable.19,20 The third category, ‘Non-Verifiable’, includes all 
resignation cases classified as No Reason. We also include in this category all 
resignations citing Outside Commitments and Personal reasons where no additional 
information about outside activities and personal circumstances are disclosed, rendering 
them vague or undefined, and thus unverifiable and less credible (see Appendix A for 
examples). This third category potentially includes resignations due to concerns about 
future performance that the director chose to mask by providing an unverifiable reason 
                                                 
18 We note that while in the case of a departure with disagreement, the implications reflect negatively on 
the firm, in the case of an investigation against a director it reflects first and foremost on the director 
herself/himself. Our sample contains only five cases of the latter and their exclusion does not alter the 
results. 
19 Examples include appointment of a director or his/her spouse to political office which required 
resignation. 
20 Departure for any of these reasons can lead to either positive or negative reaction. For example, departure 
attributed to age can be a negative signal because the departing director is likely to have significant 
experience and knowledge of the company and industry, or it can be a positive signal to the extent that the 
director was less effective given his/her age. 
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for the departure. The discussion above leads to the following hypothesis (broken into 
two parts to facilitate analyses presentation): 
 
H2a:  Investors react negatively to non-verifiable resignations 
 
H2b:  Analysts react negatively to non-verifiable resignations.21  
 
 
To the extent that a non-verifiable resignation provides a signal that the director 
potentially has concerns about the future performance of the firm, the reaction by 
investors to the resignation announcement is likely to be related to current operating 
performance and the information environment of the firm. Non-verifiable resignations 
following poor operating performance are more likely to be perceived as untruthful, and 
send a stronger signal of weak future performance, than resignations following strong 
operating performance. Hence, our hypothesis: 
 
H3a:  Investor reactions to non-verifiable resignations depend on current 
operating performance of the firm. 
 
 Similarly, the reaction also depends on the information environment. Because the 
source of investor concern about the true reason for director departure is lack of 
information about the true health and prospects of the firm, we expect the information 
environment of the firm to be a moderating factor in the reaction of investors to 
resignation announcements. Hence, our hypothesis: 
 
H3b:  Investor reactions to non-verifiable resignations depend on the 
information environment of the firm. 
 
 
                                                 
21 Note that investors' and analysts' reaction to Verifiable-Negative resignations is expected to be 
unambiguously negative, whereas we do not expect a reaction to Verifiable-Neutral resignations. Hence, 
we do not specify explicit hypotheses related to these two categories.  
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III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
We obtain data on resignations of independent directors from the Director and 
Officer Change database of Audit Analytics. Because disclosure of directors’ departure 
reasons was not mandatory prior to 2004, our sample starts in 2004.22,23  
We apply several filters to the data to ensure that our sample is meaningful and to 
facilitate empirical analysis. Firms are required to have valid Compustat and CRSP 
information prior to the filing date, valid board and director information from Boardex, 
and we retain departures of independent directors only. In addition, we restrict the 
number of business days between the announcement date (8-K filing date) and the 
effective date of departure to be no more than four days, as the new SEC disclosure rule 
requires firms to disclose resignation by officers of the firm not more than four working 
days after the event.24 We also exclude departures related to M&A, spinoffs, bankruptcy 
and restructuring because the reaction to these departures could be attributed to the event 
itself. These restrictions result in a sample of 5,647 filings by 2,916 firms from 2004 to 
2012. Table 1, Panel A describes the data restrictions and their effect on the total number 
of filings in our sample. 
                                                 
22 The change in 8-K disclosure requirements (Release No. 34-49424, Additional Form 8-K Disclosure 
Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date) issued by the SEC in March 2004, became effective on 
August 23, 2004. Results are substantially unaffected by the exclusion of year 2004 observations. 
23 The new rule significantly increased the number of events to be reported in 8-K filings, and shortened the 
time period required to disclose these events to no more than four business days after the occurrence of the 
event. See Lerman and Livnat (2010) for a more detailed description of the changes to Form 8-K, and the 
impact of changes on the value relevance of these filings and on financial statements in general. One of the 
changes to the 8-K relates to departure or election of directors and departure or appointment of principal 
officers, which are reported in Section 5.02 of the form. The change to the Section requires firms to 
immediately report resignation by directors and to disclose the reasons for the departure as provided by the 
departing director. If the company is aware that the resignation involves disagreement on any matter 
relating to the company’s operations, policies or practices, then the company must explain the nature of the 
disagreement. Prior to the change, departure of directors was reported under Item 6. Former Item 6 required 
disclosure of departure of directors only if all the following conditions applied: the director resigned as a 
result of disagreement, provided a letter of resignation describing the disagreement, and requested the 
company to publicly disclose the matter. Thus, the incidence of director departures reported under former 
Item 6 was limited to departures due to disagreement where the director specifically asked to disclose the 
nature of the disagreement. Given the limited scope of departures reported under former Item 6 and the 
discretion afforded to directors with respect to the disclosure related to the resignation, one could not 
examine the market reaction to resignation announcements that did not involve disagreement. The new rule 
also allows an analysis of the information content of the reasons for the departure as provided by the 
director. 
24 Firms may file Form 8-K stating director’s future intention of departure, in which case the filing date will 
predate the effective date of departure. Given the rare occurrence of such events (2.3% of the sample), we 
further exclude these cases. Results are not affected by this criterion. 
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[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1, Panel B tabulates the number of filings on a year-by-year basis. The 
number of filings varies from 363 to 884. The highest number of filings is observed in 
2007, which corresponds to the onset of the global financial crisis, consistent with our 
conjecture that independent directors are likely to resign when they anticipate negative 
performance in order to maintain their reputation capital. 
Table 1, Panel C provides descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this 
study. We compute announcement returns over the window encompassed by event days 
(-4,1), where day 0 is the filing date provided by Audit Analytics. We use Carhart’s 
(1997) four-factor model to calculate benchmark returns and estimate model parameters 
over a 200-day period from event day -210 to event day -11. Our focus on an event 
window (from -4 to 1) is motivated by the possibility that there is potential information 
leakage from the effective date of departure until the filing date and a wider window 
allows us to capture the full impact of the event.25 Mean returns during the six-day 
window encompassing the date of the 8-K report are -0.47%, indicating a statistically and 
economically significant negative market reaction to resignations of independent 
directors. Abnormal returns in the year prior to the resignation are significantly negative, 
with a mean (median) of -6.82% (-3.24%), indicating that independent directors resign 
following sub-par performance, consistent with the evidence in Yermack (2004). 
Moreover, returns in the year following the resignation are also significantly negative, 
with mean and median of -6.26% and -1.65%, respectively. The negative returns in the 
year after the resignation support our conjecture that independent directors may resign 
not only after but also in anticipation of poor future firm performance. The operating 
performance of the sample firms is consistent with the negative market returns; the mean 
ROA is -1.82% and the mean industry-adjusted ROA and operating cash flows in the 
most recent fiscal year ending before (after) the resignation date are significantly negative 
at -6.55% (-5.86%) and -0.87% (-1.39%), respectively.  
                                                 
25 For example, Segal and Segal (2015) show that the timing of the formal 8-K filing within the allowed 
four-day window may be chosen strategically. 
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The average age of the departing director is around 60, and average tenure on the 
board is approximately nine years. The departing director holds on average 0.6 additional 
board seats (as an independent director). Close to 20% of the departing directors serve on 
the audit committee and 17% on the nomination or compensation committee. About 22% 
of the departure cases involve more than one independent director. In 9% (35%) of the 
departure filings, the company announced the appointment of a new executive (new 
independent director). 
Board characteristics indicate that the average board size is nine members, 
including insiders. The CEO is the chairman of the board in approximately 46% of the 
cases. Less than 3% of the boards are categorized as busy, where busyness is defined 
following Fich and Shivdasani (2006).26 The average firm age, measured as the number 
of years since the IPO, is 19 years, with mean total assets of $4,331 million. Finally, we 
note that 60% of our sample firms are incorporated in the state of Delaware.27  
 
IV. Results 
 
Likelihood of Departure 
Before testing the hypothesis that the reasons for the departure provided by 
director are suspect—primarily in cases where directors potentially resign in order to 
protect their reputation capital—we first examine whether reputable directors are more 
likely to resign when they foresee poor operating performance, consistent with an attempt 
to maintain their reputation capital. We estimate the following model: 
 
Departure Dummyi,y,t  = 
a0+ a1*Reputationt,y,t + a2* Negative_Performancey,t + a3*Negative_Performancey,t+1 + 
a4*Reputationt,y,t*Negative_Performancey,t + a5*Reputationt,y,t*Negative_Performancey,t+1 + 
 Controlst,y,t + Firm and Year Effects + εit, 
                                                 
26 A board is busy if more than 50% of the independent directors hold more than three board memberships. 
27 Because Delaware law may impose somewhat different (and arguably stricter) duties on directors 
compared with other states (see, e.g., Levi et al.  2015), and given its large representation in our sample, we 
control for Delaware incorporation state in all analyses except Table 2 where fixed-effects address this 
potential issue. 
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The model is estimated at the director-firm-year level conditional on resignation 
by at least one independent director. Specifically, the observations include all the 
independent directors of firm-years where at least one of the independent directors 
resigned in that particular year. The dependent variable is Departure Dummy, which 
takes the value of 1 if director i of firm y resigned in year t, and zero otherwise. The 
independent variables include proxies for reputation; negative future performance and 
negative past performance indicators; an interaction variable of reputation with both 
future and past negative performance indicators; and controls. We test whether directors 
with a high reputation are more likely to resign when they foresee negative future 
performance based on the sign of a5 (H1b). Specifically, a positive and significant 
coefficient indicates that directors with a high reputation are more likely to resign when 
they anticipate negative future performance. Similarly, we test whether reputation is 
related to the decision to resign following weak performance based on the sign of a4. 
Following H1a we expect that the coefficient will not be different from zero. 
We measure director reputation using three specifications: (i) the log of number of 
outside board positions held by the director, (ii) an indicator with 1 if the director holds 
more than one directorship and (iii) the average market capitalization of firms where the 
director serves. Using the number of board seats as a proxy for reputation capital is 
consistent with the extant literature on director reputation (e.g., Gilson, 1990; Ferris et al., 
2003; Yermack, 2004); directors who hold more than one directorship are considered to 
have higher reputation capital. The directorships’ market capitalization specification 
captures their relative importance (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014). We cannot observe 
directors’ expectations for future performance. However, since directors are privy to 
private information, it is reasonable to assume that they are able, at minimum, to foresee 
whether the firm is likely to show positive or negative profitability in the coming period. 
Hence, Negative_Performancet+1 is measured by a loss indicator, D(Loss, t), equal to 1 if 
ROA in the corresponding year is negative and zero otherwise. We similarly measure 
D(Loss, t+1). 
The control variables include other factors that are likely to be associated with the 
likelihood of departure, such as the tenure of the director and an indicator for age greater 
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than 69 (chosen because many companies have a mandatory retirement of 70). We do not 
include additional firm-level controls such as board size and market value of equity. This 
is because the regressions are estimated at the director-firm-year level and hence adding 
firm-level controls induces a high correlation across observations. Furthermore, firm- and 
year-fixed effects are likely to capture yearly firm-level effects such as size. For the third 
specification, market value of equity enters the reputation proxy calculation. We cluster 
the standard errors at the firm level to account for possible serial correlations. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 2, Column 1 (Column 2) shows the results where reputation is measured as 
an indicator (continuous) variable based on the number independent directorships and in  
Column 3 as the average market capitalization of boards where the director serves. In all 
three specifications we observe that the likelihood of departure by independent directors 
is positively associated with reputation, indicating that reputable directors are more likely 
to resign unconditionally—perhaps because they have other board alternatives and 
consequently a lower relative cost of departure compared with directors who hold only 
one directorship position.. More importantly, the coefficient on the interaction variable of 
reputation and the negative future operating performance indicator is positive and 
significant at 10% or better in all specifications, indicating that the likelihood of 
departure given negative future operating performance increases with reputation. This 
result provides support to the hypothesis (H1b) that reputable directors are more likely to 
resign when they foresee weak operating performance in order to protect their reputation 
capital.  
Consistent with the findings in Yermack (2004), we find that the likelihood of 
departure increases with past negative profitability (p-value<0.01). However, the 
interaction of past negative profitability and reputation is negative and not significant, 
supporting the second part of the hypothesis (H1a). These findings are consistent with the 
conjecture that the effect of past financial performance on reputation is essentially a sunk 
cost because directors have already incurred the damage to their reputation. Reputable 
directors have little incentive to resign if they believe the worst is over because 
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subsequent improvement in the firm’s performance is likely to mitigate the impact of past 
performance on reputation. 
The coefficients on the other control variables suggest that the likelihood of 
departure increases with age and tenure (p-value<0.01). Taken together, the results 
indicate that the likelihood of departures increases unconditionally with reputation and 
past negative profitability. In addition, the results are consistent with the notion that 
director departures are at least partially motivated by the preservation of reputational 
capital when poor firm performance is anticipated.28 
 
Performance and Reason for Departure 
Table 3, Panel A tabulates the number of filings by departure reason and shows 
performance statistics for each category of departure reason. There are 84 resignations 
resulting from Disagreement with senior management and five cases stating that the 
director is under investigation by internal or external parties (e.g., SEC).29 In 3,487 cases 
(61% of our sample) No Reason is provided for the resignation. In 694 cases, directors 
cite Outside Commitments as the reason for departure; and, in 1,377 cases, directors 
indicate that the departure is related to health, retirement or personal reasons. The most 
striking statistics are that zero occurrences of resignations cite concern over future 
performance, and that Disagreement cases show very low incidence (only about 1.6% of 
all departures). Although there is no benchmark against which to test the number of 
resignations with disagreement, it appears to be very low compared with the frequency of 
the other categories. Put differently, if directors and firms are fully compliant and 
forthcoming with respect to disclosing the reasons for departure, this statistic suggests 
that 98.4% of director resignations take place when the director agrees with management 
on all matters “relating to the registrant’s operations, policies or practices” and concerns 
                                                 
28 Another interpretation of the results is that departure by multi-board directors can cause poor operating 
performance in subsequent periods because outside board membership is indicative of more experience or 
skill (see, e.g., Rubin and Segal, 2013). Although that reverse causality explanation is plausible, it cannot 
fully explain the results in our current study wherein we see that director departures are also preceded by 
negative performance; having skilled and experienced directors on the board does not prevent poor 
operating performance.  
29 Agrawal and Chen (2009) examine disputes involving disagreement for both inside and independent 
directors. Although they do not provide the exact number of disagreements involving independent 
directors, one can infer that the number in their sample is approximately 35 for 2005–2006. Our sample 
consists of 32 cases for the same period. 
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about future performance were in no way a consideration in the departure.30 The 
distribution of departure reasons is consistent with directors being reluctant to cite 
concerns about future performance or disagreement. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Short window returns are negative and significant for Disagreement, 
Investigation, No Reason and Outside Commitments, suggesting that on average, the 
market views them all as conveying negative news, regardless of the reason cited or lack 
thereof. At the same time, when the stated reason for departure is Personal (i.e., health, 
personal reasons or retirement), the immediate market reaction is not significantly 
different from zero, indicating that the market views the former set of reasons as 
indicating or masking concerns about future performance, while the latter is seemingly 
viewed as reliably benign. 
Examination of the preceding and following yearly abnormal returns indicates an 
average negative and significant return only for the potentially evasive No Reason and 
Outside Commitments categories. However, excess past and future profitability is 
negative and significant for all categories except Investigation and Personal; and excess 
past and future cash flows are also negative and significant for most categories. Hence, 
except for the Personal category, the results suggest that director resignations are 
significantly associated with poor past and future operating performance regardless of the 
reasons for the departure, providing additional support to the hypothesis that directors 
who resign because of concerns about future performance may choose to mask the 
reason.  
We further investigate the issue of seemingly benign resignation reasons by 
partitioning the reasons for departure into two groups based on how reliable and 
verifiable the reason signal is, compared with the alternative base notion that it is 
                                                 
30 Item 5.02 requires knowledge by management of such disagreement on the part of the departing 
directors. Thus, to avoid stating disagreement as the cause of departure (when indeed disagreement exists), 
the resigning director must either conceal their disagreement altogether, or refrain from making their 
disagreement formally registered—thereby allowing management to avoid its acknowledgement. Either 
scenario suggests potential breach of fiduciary duty and role as board members (see discussion in Section 
II). Segal and Segal (2015) provide evidence consistent with managers engaging in strategic disclosure of 
8-K reports by delaying or obfuscating negative news in order to mitigate the potential market reaction. 
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prompted by personal incentives related to effort aversion or preservation of reputational 
capital in anticipation of poor performance (Mercer, 2004; Hutton et al., 2003). In 
particular, Disagreement and Investigation are two clear cases where the reason per se 
conveys negative news and is unlikely to be misrepresented, so there is no tension in such 
cases. A director has no incentive to report Disagreement when the resignation is not 
associated with disagreement. In contrast, the No Reason category is classified as non-
verifiable given the lack of information about the reason for departure. To be able to 
classify the departures related to Outside Commitments and Personal into the verifiable 
and non-verifiable categories, we supplement the Audit Analytics database classifications 
by additional verification of the original Form 8-K where the resignation is announced. 
We classify departure due to Personal or Outside Commitment as verifiable if details 
about personal or outside commitments are revealed. For example, resignations attributed 
to Health are classified as verifiable because health is less likely to be cited 
opportunistically as it reduces the likelihood of additional employment and is to a large 
extent verifiable. Retirement is classified as verifiable where the director will be 69 or 
more in the year following the departure, and is otherwise considered non-verifiable (the 
classification of Retirement in Audit Analytics does not correspond to mandatory 
retirement but rather to all filing language stating ‘retirement from the board’, in the 
sense of ‘leaving’ or ‘stepping down’—see example in Appendix A). Personal reasons 
(unless specific information is provided) are highly ambiguous and may easily be used 
opportunistically. Outside Commitments are also ambiguous and vague so we choose to 
classify these resignations as non-verifiable except for eleven cases where the director 
clearly states that the Outside Commitment is related to political nomination or 
candidacy.  
Table 3, Panel B provides the frequency of departure cases by verifiability. In 
total, we have 1,272 (4,375) departure cases that are classified as verifiable (non-
verifiable). 
Table 3, Panel C shows the performance statistics by verifiability category. 
Because the verifiable cases include Disagreement and Investigation categories—obvious 
negative news—whereas the remaining reasons for departure in this category like Health 
or Personal reasons have no negative implication, we further partition our verifiable 
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group into Verifiable-Neutral and Verifiable-Negative. The performance metrics for the 
non-verifiable category are uniformly negative, indicating that non-verifiable resignations 
are preceded and followed by negative operating performance as well as negative stock 
returns (consistent with H2a). In contrast, the performance measures are not significantly 
different from zero for the Verifiable-Neutral group, consistent with the notion that such 
departures are not associated with past performance, nor do these departures convey a 
negative signal about future performance. Comparing the performance statistics across 
the Verifiable-Neutral and Non-Verifiable groups (difference between columns 1 and 3), 
we find that the performance measures of the latter group are significantly more negative, 
with two-tailed p-values mostly less than 1%. Although verifiable, Disagreement and 
Investigation are two clear cases where the reason per se conveys negative news 
(Verifiable-Negative) and the short-term announcement return is indeed significantly 
negative at -2.3%. Nevertheless, and perhaps surprisingly, the Verifiable-Negative group 
is not as uniformly or significantly negative as the seemingly benign Non-Verifiable 
group; Disagreement and Investigation do not tend to be preceded nor followed by 
negative annual abnormal returns, although past and future profitability is negative and 
significant (cash flows are negative but not significant).  
We further examine the association between the reason for departure and returns 
around the announcement date and in the year following the resignation, using 
multivariate regressions. To avoid the problem of full rank, we use Verifiable-Neutral 
departures (due to Health, Retirement, or verifiable Personal and Outside Commitments) 
as the holdout group, because this category of resignations attracts no market reaction. 
The independent variables include the resignation category dummies (Disagreement, No 
Reason, Outside Commitments and Personal). In addition, we include director, 
governance and firm characteristics. We cluster standard errors at the firm level to 
account for serial correlations. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]  
 
Column (1) of Table 4 provides results of the short-window announcement 
returns regression. With the exception of the Personal category, the coefficients on the 
resignation categories are all negative and significant. While the negative coefficient on 
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the Disagreement category is expected, the negative coefficient on the No Reason and 
Outside Commitments resignation categories indicates that investors seem to interpret 
both as a signal of bad news about the firm. Since all resignations with No Reason and 
most Outside Commitments are classified as Non-verifiable (Table 3 Panel B), these 
results indicate investors do not find the disclosed reasons credible and react negatively 
to Non-verifiable resignations, in support of H2a.31 The coefficient on the Personal 
reasons category is negative but not different from zero.32 A possible interpretation of this 
is that investors seem to give the benefit of the doubt in cases where personal reasons are 
cited. Additional tests with respect to future abnormal returns (discussed later) indicate 
that this trust may not be merited. Also, based on Table 3 Panel B, approximately 85% of 
Personal reasons category observations are classified as Verifiable.  The coefficients on 
the control variables indicate that the short window negative market reaction is somewhat 
mitigated when the company announces the appointment of a new independent director in 
the same filing, when the director served on the compensation committee, or when the 
director's tenure is long.  
In order to examine whether the extent of the information’s creditability and 
verifiability are the underlying characteristics associated with the differential market 
reaction, we present specification (3) in Table 4. The coefficient on Verifiable-Negative 
indicator is predictably negative and statistically significant. More importantly, the 
coefficient on Non-Verifiable resignation reasons is negative and significant. This result 
indicates that the verifiability of the stated resignation reason is a fundamental 
determinant of market reaction. 
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 4 replicate the regressions in Columns (1) and (3) 
using future one-year abnormal returns as the dependent variable. These regressions 
examine whether investors under- or over-react to the resignation announcement during 
the event window. If investors did not over- or under-react during the event window then 
we should observe that the coefficients on the resignation categories are not different 
from zero. With respect to specification (2), where stated categories are analyzed, results 
                                                 
31 Eleven cases of Outside Commitments (0.86%) are identified as verifiable and are classified as 
Verifiable-neutral as part of the hold-out group in column (3) specification. 
32 In untabulated results, we look at alternative event windows (CAR[-4,4], CAR[-4,0] and CAR[-1,1]) and 
we obtain similar results. 
24 
 
indicate that the coefficients on the Disagreement and No Reason categories are not 
significantly different from zero, implying that the negative market reaction to these 
categories during the event window was, on average, accurate. However, the coefficient 
on the Outside Commitments and Personal categories are negative and significant at 10% 
and 5% respectively (two-tailed), indicating that investors seem to underreact to these 
categories of resignations during the event window. Put differently, although departures 
for personal reasons do not elicit an immediate negative response from the market, the 
future one-year abnormal returns suggest that such firms underperform the market. The 
results are consistent with the interpretation that directors are not completely forthcoming 
about their departure reasons and the market makes partial inferences from the stated 
reasons. Specification (4), where resignations are classified based on verifiability, 
provides some additional insights. It shows that although the market reaction to non-
verifiable resignation reasons generated a negative and significant market reaction around 
the announcement date (Column 3), there is still additional underperformance in the 
following year. These results support the hypothesis that verifiability of the information 
is the underlying factor in market response to resignations and further suggest that the 
market underreacts to this information. We therefore include in all later analyses 
verifiability classification in addition to stated reasons results. 
 
Reaction, Current Performance and the Information Environment 
Our next set of analyses further investigates the association between departure 
reasons and short-window announcement returns while examining the effects of 
concurrent operating performance and the information environment on this association. 
Investors are likely to respond negatively to unverifiable departure reasons for fear that 
they signal poor future performance; therefore we hypothesize that departures announced 
during ‘good times’ are less likely to entail a negative market reaction even when the 
stated reason is less credible (H3a). Put differently, given that performance is correlated 
at least in the short-term, resignation following negative operating performance is likely 
to signal future negative operating performance, whereas a resignation following positive 
performance is less likely to carry this implication. In H3b we also hypothesize that the 
reaction to the resignation categories depends on the firm’s information environment. 
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Because the source of investor concern about the true reason for director departure is lack 
of information about the true prospects of the firm, we expect the information 
environment of the firm to be a moderating factor in the reaction of investors to 
resignation announcements.  
We empirically examine the moderating impact of the concurrent operating 
performance and information environment by including interaction variables of the 
resignation categories with concurrent profitability and number of analysts following. To 
the extent that these factors indeed moderate investors’ reaction, the coefficients on the 
interaction variables are expected to be positive.  
 
 [INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]  
 
Table 5 presents the regression results. Columns (1) and (2) show the results 
including interaction terms for resignation categories and profitability. As reported in 
Table 4, with the exception of Personal reasons, the coefficient on the resignation 
categories is negative and significant in specification (1). More importantly, with the 
same exception for Personal Reasons, the coefficient on the interaction variables of the 
resignation categories with profitability are all positive and significant in support of H3a, 
indicating that current operating performance positively affects the market reaction to 
director departures. Similarly in specification 2, the interaction of information 
environment proxy—the number of analysts following—with the departure categories is 
positive for all categories, though significant only for the No Reason and Personal 
categories, indicating that a better information environment reduces the uncertainty 
associated with the signal related to the resignation and therefore mitigates a negative 
investor reaction (in support of H3b). Columns (3) and (4) show results of analyses using 
verifiability classification and draw similar conclusions; the coefficients on the 
interaction variables of Non-Verifiable with profitability and with analyst following are 
all positive and significant indicating the moderating effect of information about 
contemporaneous financial performance and information environment.  
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Analysts’ Reaction to Directors’ Departure 
The results thus far indicate that investors react negatively to departures, and that 
the reaction is more negative if the reason provided by the director is non-verifiable. In 
addition, the reaction is affected by current operating performance and the information 
environment of the firm. In this sub-section, we examine analysts’ reaction to director 
resignations and the reason provided (hypothesis H2b). Given that financial analysts are 
adept at information gathering and interpretation, they understand the incentive of 
departing directors not to reveal concerns about future performance and can potentially 
see through the opaque justifications given for departure. Moreover, analysts are better 
equipped to assemble the pieces in the mosaic of firm-related information and translate 
their implications into tangible forecasts. Therefore we explore the occurrence and 
direction of analyst forecast revisions following director departures and their association 
with departure reasons.  
One obstacle is the evidence in Rubin et al. (2015) which suggests analysts tend 
not to react to non-financial information such as director resignations. In particular, they 
find that, on average, analysts react to only 38% of all non-financial events reported on 
Form 8-K. Their results are puzzling because the low reaction relates to non-financial 
events that trigger a significant market reaction. Nevertheless, the authors provide 
evidence that analysts who react to non-financial information are more skillful. We 
therefore focus on the group of analysts that react to resignation announcements.  
Since the analysis is conditional on the reaction, and resignation by directors 
represents negative news, we expect a priori that the reaction is on average negative. 
However, if analysts take the reasons for resignation at face value then we expect 
variation in the likelihood of reaction across categories and in the sign of the reaction. In 
particular, there should be lower likelihood and less negative reaction to all categories in 
comparison to the Disagreement category. Finding a similar frequency of reaction across 
categories—as well as analysts revising forecasts downwards regardless of the reason for 
departure—would provide further evidence that market participants do not take the cited 
reason at face value.  
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]  
 
27 
 
Table 6, Panel A provides descriptive statistics. To be included in the sample we 
require at least one forecast of current fiscal year earnings prior to the departure filing. 
Out of the 5,647 filings in our sample, 3,865 resignations are by directors of firms 
covered by IBES. Of the 3,865 resignations, we identify 1,026 resignations (about 26%) 
that triggered a current fiscal year forecast revision by at least one analyst. We define 
‘reaction’ to resignation if the forecast revision occurs between the event date and six 
calendar days after the filing date.33 The relatively low reaction to departures is consistent 
with the findings in Rubin et al. (2015) and suggests that there is no analyst reaction for 
most resignation cases. Looking across the resignation categories, we observe that the 
reaction to the benign categories is similar to the sample average, yet the reaction to 
resignations citing disagreement is only approximately 15% (8 out of 52 cases), with an 
average forecast revision of -0.11.34 To the extent that analysts’ reaction to disagreements 
represents a benchmark for reaction to resignations with a clear negative signal by the 
director regarding future performance, the stronger reaction to supposedly benign 
resignations—for example, 144 out of 490 or 29% in the case of outside commitments, 
with an average forecast revision of -0.53—indicates that analysts do not take the cited 
reasons at face value.  
Column (4) of Panel A shows that the average number of analysts following the 
firm is around nine, and is similar across the resignation categories. Column (5) shows 
the total number of revisions for each category, and Column (6) provides the proportion 
of analysts who reacted to the news. For example, there were 52 resignation cases with 
disagreement in firms covered by IBES. Of the 52 cases, eight cases (15%) elicited 
forecast revision by at least one analyst. Interestingly, the proportion of resignations that 
resulted in forecast revisions for the entire sample is much higher at 27% (1,026 revisions 
out of 3,865 resignations), as are the proportions for each of the other reason categories, 
ranging from 26% to 29%. The number or proportion of analysts who reacted is another 
useful indicator. The average number of analysts following the firms where disagreement 
                                                 
33 We also run the analysis using three days after the filing date as the cutoff. However, we note that three 
calendar days may cover as little as one business day, while more than 400 revisions occur between days 
four and six after the filing date. Given the limited sample size, we present the 6-day cutoff. Results are 
similar when we use the 3-day cutoff.  
34  We refer to Disagreement/Investigation category in Table 6 for consistency of presentation. There are no 
cases of forecast revision related to investigation. 
28 
 
was cited is 8.1, so the maximum number of potential revisions in reaction to these eight 
cases is 64. However, the total number of revisions amounted to 26, indicating that only 
40% of the analysts covering firms that reported resignation citing disagreement reacted. 
The proportion of analysts who reacted to the news is an additional measure of the 
importance of the resignation event. Resignation events with stronger implications for 
future earnings should elicit a greater reaction frequency. Indeed, while the average 
proportion for the full sample is 31%, disagreement cases elicit reactions by 40% of the 
analysts (Column (6) of Panel A). However, Outside Commitments elicit almost as high a 
proportion of reactions (39%), and the average proportion of reacting analysts to the other 
two categories is around 30%. Taken together, these results indicate that resignations 
citing benign reasons are more likely to generate forecast revisions than those citing 
disagreement (column 3 divided by column 2). Moreover, the proportion of analysts who 
react to resignations with disagreement (column 6) is similar to that for the seemingly 
benign Outside Commitments, though higher than the proportion of analysts who react to 
the Personal and No Reason categories.  
Column (7) shows the average change in the forecast. We compute the change in 
the forecast as the ratio of the change in the forecast (new forecast minus previous 
forecast) to the absolute value of the previous forecast. A negative sign indicates 
downward revision. On average, resignations elicit strong negative (-22%) and 
statistically significant forecast revision (p-value<0.01). We also observe a negative 
reaction across the various categories, and the reaction is significant for the No Reason 
and Outside Commitments categories (p-value<0.01). The reaction to the Disagreement 
category is marginally significant (two-tailed p-value=0.116), and the reaction to the 
Personal category, which includes many verifiable resignations, is not statistically 
significant.   
Table 6, Panel B shows the distribution of resignation cases that triggered forecast 
revision and the mean revision for the Verifiable-Neutral, Verifiable-Negative, and non-
verifiable categories. The non-verifiable category includes all No Reason cases and all 
Outside Commitments cases except for one verifiable case. Both are associated with a 
negative and significant forecast revision. Of the 272 Personal cases in the sample, 37 are 
classified as non-verifiable and 235 as verifiable. The Personal cases in the non-verifiable 
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category is associated with a negative though marginally significant reaction (two-tailed 
p-value=0.115); whereas the reaction to those cases in the verifiable category is, as 
expected, not significantly different from zero. Overall, consistent with the reaction by 
investors and in support of H2b, analysts do not take the reason cited, or lack thereof, at 
face value. Non-verifiable departures send a negative signal to the market while 
Verifiable-Neutral departures (personal reasons such as retirement due to age or health 
issues) are not followed by a significant change in the forecast.35  
Panel C of Table 6 shows the results of a multivariate analysis where the 
dependent variable is the average forecast revision for the resignation. The sample 
comprises resignations that elicit at least one reaction. The holdout group consists of 
verifiable departures that are due to Health, Personal and Retirement reasons (Verifiable-
Neutral group). Negative and significant coefficients on all non-verifiable categories—
namely No Reason, Outside Commitments and Personal reasons—would be consistent 
with a negative interpretation of these departures. Surprisingly, in specification (1) one of 
the coefficients—for the Disagreement indicator—is not significant. One potential 
explanation is the small number of resignations with disagreement in this subsample 
(only eight). Specification (2) where resignations are classified based on verifiability 
yields similar results where non-verifiable resignation reasons are significantly associated 
with downward forecast revisions. Hence, these results are consistent with the univariate 
analysis and indicate that non-verifiable reasons for resignations are considered to be a 
negative signal for future performance.  
 
V. Conclusions 
 
In this investigation of the information content of the reasons cited by 
independent directors for resignation, our main hypothesis is that directors have an 
incentive to disguise the true reason for the resignation to the extent that it is related to 
concerns about future performance of the firm. Citing such concerns or disagreement 
                                                 
35 Verifiable-Neutral resignations may provide a positive signal, especially if the departing director is 
expected to be replaced by a more effective director (e.g., Huang 2013). Such cases are expected if the 
departing director leaves for health or age reasons.  
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with management on any issue related to the operation or policies of the firm comes at a 
significant cost to the director and to the firm, due to the potentially adverse effect on the 
director’s equity holding, business relations, and future directorship opportunities. 
We show that directors with a high reputation are more likely to resign in 
anticipation of weak future performance. Consistent with previous research, we find that 
the departure of independent directors elicits an immediate negative market reaction and 
is associated with poor financial and operating performance in the year before as well as 
the year after the resignation. However, these results hold only for cases where there is 
ambiguity or difficulty in verifying the true motive for departure. Our results support the 
notion that investors are aware of the personal incentive for directors to distance 
themselves from a poorly performing firm, and thus regard the explanation for the 
departure with suspicion. Moreover, the gap in information vis-a-vis investors is a 
significant driver of negative market reactions to such resignations. Conversely, 
concurrent positive performance indicators, as well as a better information environment, 
may mitigate this effect. Corroborating evidence is gleaned from examining how 
sophisticated participants react to director departures: analysts interpret such resignations 
similarly negatively, and revise their forecasts downwards in response to seemingly 
benign departures. 
Our findings imply that some directors, possibly with the tacit agreement of the 
firm, disguise the true motive for resignation when it is related to concerns about future 
performance, for example by citing ‘time constraints’ or not providing a reason.   
  
31 
 
References 
Agrawal, A., Chen, M., 2009,  “Boardroom Brawls: An Empirical Analysis of Disputes 
Involving Directors” , Working Paper 
 
Agrawal, A., Knoeber, C., 1996, “Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency 
Problems between Managers and Shareholders” , Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, Vol. 31, 377-397. 
 
Asthana, S., Balsam, S., 2009, “Determinants of Outside Director Turnover”, Working 
Paper. 
 
Bebchuk, L., Fried, J., 2006, “Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of 
Executive Compensation”, Harvard University Press 
 
Bhagat, S., Black, B., 1997, “Do Independent Directors Matter?” Working Paper 
 
Bhagat, S., Black, B., 2002. “The Non-Correlation between Board Independence and 
Long-Term Firm Performance”, Journal of Corporation Law, Vol.27, 231-273. 
 
Black, B., Cheffins, B., Klausner, M., 2006, “Outside Director Liability”, Stanford Law 
Review, Vol. 58, 1055-1159.  
 
Brochet, F., Srinivasan, S., 2014, “Accountability of independent directors: Evidence 
from firms subject to securities litigation”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 111, 
430-449. 
 
Brown, J. Robert, 2007, “Essay: Corporate Governance, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and the Limits of Disclosure” (April 23, 2007). Catholic University Law 
Review, Vol. 57, No. 45, April 23 
 
Carhart, M. M., 1997, “On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance,” Journal of Finance 
52, pp. 57–82. 
 
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R., Larcker, D., 1999, “Corporate governance, chief executive 
officer compensation, and firm performance”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.51, 
371-406. 
 
Delaware Supreme Court, 1998, “Malone v. Brincat” No. 459, 1997 
 
Dewally, M., Peck, S.W., 2009, Upheaval in the boardroom: Outside director public 
resignations, motivations, and consequences, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.16, 38-
52  
 
Fahlenbrach, R., Low, A., Stulz, R., 2010, “The Dark Side of Independent directors: Do 
They Quit When They are Most Needed?” Working Paper 
 
32 
 
Fairfax, M. L., 2005, “Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors' 
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability”, Houston Law Review, Vol.42, 393-456 
 
Fama, E., 1980. “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm”, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol.88, 288-307. 
 
Fama, E., Jensen, M., 1983, “Separation of Ownership and Control.” Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol.26, 301-25. 
 
Ferris, S., P., Jagannathan, M., and Pritchard, A. C., 2003, “Too Busy to Mind the 
Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments” The Journal of 
Finance Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 1087-1111 
 
Fich, E., Shivdasani, A., 2006, “Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?”, Journal of 
Finance, Vol.61, 689-724. 
  
Fich, E., Shivdasani, A., 2007, “Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder 
wealth”, Journal of Financial Economics Vol.86, 306–336 
 
Gilson, S., 1990, “Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders. Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol.27, 355–387. 
 
Gupta, M., Fields, P., 2009, “Board Independence and Corporate Governance: Evidence 
From Director Resignations”, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol.36(1) & 
(2), 161–184 
 
Harford, J. 2003. “Takeover Bids and Target Directors’ Incentives: The Impact of a Bid 
on Directors Wealth and Board Seats”. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 69, 51-83. 
 
Hermalin, B., Weisbach, M., 1991, “The Effects of Board Composition and Direct 
Incentives On Firm Performance”, Financial Management, Vol. 20, 101-112. 
 
Hermalin, B., Weisbach, M., 1998. “Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their 
Monitoring of the CEO”, American Economic Review, Vol. 88, 96-118. 
 
Huang, S., 2013 “Zombie Board: Board Tenure and Firm Performance”, INSEAD 
working paper 
 
Hutton, A., Miller, G., Skinner, D., 2003. “The Role of Supplementary Statements with 
Management Earnings Forecasts”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 41, 867-890. 
 
Klein, A., 1998, “Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure”, Journal of Law 
and Economics, Vol.41, 275-303. 
 
Lerman, A., Livnat, J., 2010, “The New Form 8-K Disclosures”, Review of Accounting 
Studies, Vol. 15, 752-778. 
33 
 
 
Levi, S., Segal, B., Segal D., 2015. “Do fiduciary duties to creditors reduce debt-covenant 
avoidance?”, Working Paper. 
 
Linn, S., Park, D., 2005, “Outside Director Compensation Policy and The Investment 
Opportunity Set”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 11, 680-715. 
 
Lorsch, J., MacIver, E., 1989, “Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America’s Corporate 
Boards”, Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Marshall, C., 2010, “Are Dissenting Directors Rewarded?”, Working Paper  
 
Masulis, R. W., Mobbs, S. 2014. “Independent director incentives: Where do talented 
directors spend their limited time and energy?”, Journal of Financial Economics. Vol. 
111 Issue 2, 406-429. 
 
Mercer, M., 2004, ”How Do Investors Assess the Credibility of Management 
Disclosures?”, Accounting Horizons, Vol.18, 185-196. 
 
Nguyen, B. D., Nielsen, K. M., 2009, “The Value of Independent Directors: Evidence 
from Sudden Deaths”, Working Paper 
 
Pearl Meyer & Partners, 2002, “Director Compensation Report” 
 
Perry, T., 2000, “Incentive Compensation for Independent directors and CEO turnover,” 
Working Paper 
 
Rosenstein, S., Wyatt, J., 1990, “Independent Directors, Board Independence, and 
Shareholder Wealth,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.26, 175-192. 
 
Rubin, A., Segal, B., & Segal, D. (2015). The Interpretation of Unanticipated News 
Arrival and Analysts’ Skill. Forthcoming in Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis 
 
Rubin, A., Segal, D., 2013, “Directors Skill and Financial Reporting Quality” Working 
Paper.  
 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 1989, “Acceleration of the Timing for 
Filing Forms 8-K Relating to Changes in Accountants and Resignations of Directors; 
Amendments to Regulation S-K Regarding Changes in Accountants”, Release No. 34-
26587, March 2. 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2004, “Additional Form 8-K Disclosure 
Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date”, Release No. 34-49424, March 16. 
 
34 
 
Segal B., Segal D., 2015, “Are managers strategic in reporting non-earnings news? 
Evidence on timing and news bundling”. Forthcoming in Review of Accounting Studies. 
 
Shu, Z. S., 2000, “Auditor Resignations: Clientele Effects and Legal Liability”, Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, Vol.29, 173-205 
 
Srinivasan, S., 2005, “Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Independent 
Directors: Evidence from Accounting Restatements”, Journal of Accounting Research, 
Vol.43, 291–334.  
 
Yermack, D., 2004, “Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for 
Independent Directors”, Journal of Finance, Vol.59, 2281-308. 
35 
 
Appendix A 
 
Disagreement (Verifiable) 
 
PRO PHARMACEUTICALS INC, 8-K Date: September 15, 2006 
 
“On September 12, 2006, we received a letter from David H. Smith, one of our directors, 
notifying us of Mr. Smith’s resignation from the Board of Directors of Pro-Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
effective immediately. Mr. Smith was a member of our Compensation Committee. In his letter, 
Mr. Smith indicated that his resignation was due to differences on how the company has been and 
continues to be managed, including our recent financing. A copy of Mr. Smith’s resignation letter 
is filed herewith as Exhibit 17.”  
 
Investigation (Verifiable) 
 
EAGLE BROADBAND, INC., 8-K Date: September 15, 2006 
 
“In a special meeting of the Board of Directors held on September 15, 2006, the members of the 
Board of Directors unanimously voted to remove H. Dean Cubley as a director of the Company. 
On August 23, 2006, Mr. Cubley filed a lawsuit against the company for non-payment of a note 
issued by the Company in December 2003. The company believes Mr. Cubley wrongfully 
induced the Board to approve the issuance of the note and intends to vigorously defend the 
lawsuit.” 
 
No Reason (Non-verifiable) 
 
REPLIDYNE INC, 8-K Date: April 19, 2007 
 
“Ralph E. Christoffersen, Ph.D., a member of the board of directors of the Company (the 
“Board”) whose term will expire at the Company’s 2007 annual stockholder meeting (the 
“Annual Meeting”), indicated to the Company on April 13, 2007 that he does not intend to stand 
for re-election at the Annual Meeting. Dr. Christoffersen’s decision not to stand for re-election is 
not due to any disagreement with the Company.” 
 
IMPCO TECHNOLOGIES INC, 8-K Date: January 6, 2006 
 
“On January 5, 2006, Don J. Simplot announced his resignation from the Board of Directors of 
IMPCO Technologies, Inc. effective immediately.” 
 
Outside Commitments (Verifiable) 
 
Reebok International Ltd., 8-K Date: April 24, 2005 
 
“On April 24, 2005, because of the expected demands from his recently announced candidacy for 
Governor of Massachusetts, Deval Patrick, one of the Company’s independent directors, tendered 
his resignation as director.   Mr. Patrick’s resignation was accepted on April 28.  The Company 
does not expect to fill the vacancy immediately and will remove Mr. Patrick from the slate of 
directors to be elected at its upcoming Annual Meeting.” 
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Outside Commitments (Non-verifiable) 
 
AMERICAN MEDICAL SYSTEMS HOLDINGS, INC, 8-K Date: 21 Mar 2006 
 
“On March, 21, 2006, Douglas W. Kohrs, Chairman of the Board of Directors and a director of 
American Medical Systems Holdings, Inc., notified the company that he would not stand for re-
election to the Board of Directors at the 2006 annual meeting of stockholders and that he was 
resigning from the Board effective March 21, 2006 in order to devote his full attention to a new 
business opportunity.” 
 
Personal (Verifiable) 
 
CINTAS CORPORATION, 8-K Date: January 24, 2006 
 
“Cintas Corporation Board member Robert J. Herbold resigned from the Board of Directors on 
January 24, 2006 because his wife has been appointed as U.S. Ambassador to Singapore. 
Consequently, Mr. Herbold will be spending a significant amount of time in Asia and unable to 
travel to Cincinnati on a regular basis to attend Cintas Board meetings. The Nominating and 
Governance Committee is engaged in a search for an independent director to replace Mr. 
Herbold.” 
 
Personal (Non-verifiable) 
 
ALTEON INC /DE, 8-K Date: November 24, 2006 
 
“On November 17, 2006, George M. Naimark, Ph.D., a member of the Board of Directors of 
Alteon Inc. (the “Company”), notified the Company of his decision to resign as a Director, 
effective immediately, for personal reasons. The Company thanks Dr. Naimark for his important 
contributions throughout the years.” 
 
INFOSPACE, INC., 8-K Date: October 3, 2006 
 
“InfoSpace, Inc. (NASDAQ: INSP) announced today that Rufus W. Lumry, III has resigned as a 
director of InfoSpace, effective October 3, 2006. Mr. Lumry, who has served on the board since 
December 1998, is leaving for personal reasons.” 
 
Health (Verifiable) 
 
LAMAR ADVERTISING COMPANY,8-K Date: December 3,2008  
 
“Robert M. Jelenic, a director of Lamar Advertising Company (the “Company”), died on 
December 3, 2008. Mr. Jelenic served as a director of the Company since February 2004 and was 
a member of the Audit Committee.”  
 
WESTMORELAND COAL CO, 8-K Date: January 12, 2006 
 
“Pemberton Hutchinson, a member of the Westmoreland Coal Company Board of Directors, has 
submitted his resignation effective January 6, 2006 for reasons related to his health.” 
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Retirement (Verifiable) 
 
GOTTSCHALKS INC, 8-K Date: April 25, 2005 
 
“Mr. Max Gutmann, age 82, has been a Director of the Company since 1992, and on April 19, 
2005, informed the Company that he intends to resign from the Board of Directors effective May 
1, 2005. The Company is engaged in a search for a replacement who will, among other things, 
meet the independence requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission and The New 
York Stock Exchange.” 
 
 
Retirement (Non-verifiable)* 
 
 InPhonic, Inc, 8-K Date: October 13, 2006 
 
“On October 9, 2006 Jay C. Hoag notified the Company that he was retiring from the Board of 
Directors effective as of October 13, 2006. Mr. Hoag indicated that his resignation was not the 
result of any disagreement that existed between him and the Company relating to the Company’s 
operations, policies or practices. Mr. Hoag served on the Company’s Board of Directors since 
June 2003”.  
 
* Authors’ note: these are misclassifications in the Audit Analytics database, where a 
form of the word ‘retire’ was used in the announcement, in the sense of ‘stepping down’, 
rather than reaching retirement age. Mr. Hoag was 52 years old at time of announcement 
and subsequently joined TheStreet.com Inc. as an independent director in 2007. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A tabulates sample losses due to data screening. Panel B tabulates number of departure filings by 
calendar years. Panel C provides sample statistics. ‘CAR[x,y]’ is the cumulative abnormal return calculated 
over event window x and y, where day 0 is the filing date provided by Audit Analytics. We use Carhart’s 
(1997) four-factor model to calculate benchmark returns and estimate model parameters over 200-day 
period prior to the event window. ‘Excess past (future) profitability’ is calculated as the industry adjusted 
return on assets in the most recent fiscal year preceding (following) the 8-K filing date. ‘Excess past 
(future) cash flow’ is the industry adjusted operating cash flows scaled by total assets in the most recent 
fiscal year preceding (following) the 8-K filing date. Industry adjusted variables are computed by 
subtracting the median of the variable in the same Fama-French 48 industries in the same year. ‘Tenure’ is 
number of years directors have been on the board. ‘Age’ is the age of directors. 
‘D(Audit/Compensation/Nomination)’ is a dummy equal to one if departing director sits on 
audit/compensation/nomination committee. ‘Independent directorship’ is number of independent 
directorships at other firms. ‘D(Multi Departure)’ is a dummy equal to one if there are multiple departures 
from the same company on the same day. ‘D(Appoint Exe)’ is a dummy equal to one if an executive 
director is appointed on the same day and ‘D(Appoint Indep Dir)’ is a dummy equal to one if an 
independent director is appointed on the same day as departure filing, zero otherwise. ‘D(CEO-Chair)’ is a 
dummy equal to one if CEO is also the chairman of the board. ‘Board Size’ is number of directors. ‘D(Busy 
Board)’ is a dummy equal to one if more than 50% of directors hold more than three board memberships. 
‘Analyst Coverage’ is number of analysts covering the firm in one year, where analyst forecast information 
is from I/B/E/S. ‘D(Delaware)’ is an indicator that takes value of one if a firm is incorporated in Delaware. 
‘Firm Age’ is the number of years from its first appearance on CRSP. ‘Total Asset’ is total assets 
(Mnemonics ‘at’). ‘ROA’ is income before extraordinary items (Mnemonics ‘ib’) over lagged total assets. 
 
Panel A Sample selection and number of filings removed 
 Starting sample 212,152 
 Filing year >= 2004 (4,288) 
 Valid Compustat and CRSP (89,001) 
 Exclude filings related to non-board member (49,911) 
 Only independent director (6,525) 
 Only departure  (43,840) 
 Valid board information from Boardex (9,597) 
 
Departure due to M&A, Spin Off, 
Bankruptcy, Restructuring (3,293) 
 Effective date and filing date <= 4 Business days (50) 
 Final sample 5,647 
 
 
 
Panel B Number of filings by year 
  N % 
 2004 363 6.43 
 2005 860 15.23 
 2006 781 13.83 
 2007 884 15.65 
 2008 722 12.79 
 2009 650 11.51 
 2010 549 9.72 
 2011 439 7.77 
 2012 399 7.07 
 Total 5,647 100 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics Continued 
 
Panel C Summary Statistics 
  Mean Median Std P25 P75 
t-test of mean=0
(P value) 
Performance measure       
 CAR[-4,1] -0.47% -0.28% 10.94% -3.47% 2.94% 0.006 
 CAR[-360,-5] -6.82% -3.24% 98.01% -50.16% 38.73% 0.000 
 CAR[2,360] -6.26% -1.65% 80.26% -43.89% 37.30% 0.000 
 Excess past profitability -6.55% -0.09% 30.02% -5.43% 3.42% 0.000 
 Excess future profitability -5.86% -0.10% 24.63% -5.58% 3.24% 0.000 
 Excess past cash flow -0.87% 0.09% 14.98% -3.96% 5.54% 0.000 
 Excess future cash flow -1.39% 0.20% 21.49% -3.92% 5.14% 0.000 
        
Director Characteristics       
 Tenure 8.92 6.67 7.66 3.50 11.92  
 Age 59.78 60.50 11.14 51.50 68.33  
 D(Audit) 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00  
 D(Nomination) 0.17 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.00  
 D(Compensation) 0.17 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.00  
 IndependentDirectorship 0.61 0.00 0.99 0.00 1.00  
 D(Multi Departure) 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00  
 D(Appoint Exe) 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00  
 D(Appoint Indep Dir) 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00  
        
Board Characteristics       
 D(CEO-Chair) 0.46 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00  
 Board Size 9.26 9.00 2.91 7.00 11.00  
 D(Board Busy) 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00  
        
Firm Characteristics       
 Analyst Coverage 6.88 4.00 8.29 0.00 11.00  
 Firm Age 18.85 13.00 16.34 8.00 25.00  
 D(Delaware) 0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00  
 Total Assets 4,331 725 12,115 169 2,593  
  ROA -1.82% 1.45% 16.48% -3.35% 6.42%   
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Table 2: Likelihood of Departure 
 
The table reports results of an estimation of the likelihood of director departure given a measure of their 
reputation and past and future firm performance. The regressions are based on Boardex universe. We 
include in the sample all independent directors of firm-years where at least one of the independent directors 
resigned during the year. The dependent variable is an indicator with one if an independent director left the 
board and zero otherwise. ‘D(Independent directorship>=1)’ is a dummy equal to one if number of 
independent directorships is more than one. ‘Log number of independent directorship’ is log of one plus 
number of independent directorship at other firms. ‘Board Reputation’ is the average market capitalization 
of firms where the director serves. ‘D(Loss, t)’ is a dummy equal to one if ROA is negative in the most 
recent financial statement prior to departure. ‘D(Loss, t+1) is a dummy equal to one if ROA is negative in 
the year immediately after the director departure filing. ‘D(Age>69)’ is a dummy equal to one if the age of 
departing director is more than 69 years old. All the other variables are defined under Table 1. Constants 
are included but not displayed. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at firm 
level. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed significance level at 10%, 5% 
and 1% level. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
D(Leave) D(Leave) D(Leave) 
        
D(Outside directorship>1) 0.083 
(1.717)* 
D(Outside directorship>1)*D(Loss, t) -0.116 
(-1.357) 
D(Outside directorship>1)*D(Loss, t+1) 0.184 
(2.161)** 
Log Number of outside directorship 0.084 
(1.748)* 
Log Number of Outside directorship*D(Loss, t) -0.042 
(-0.487) 
Log Number of Outside directorship*D(Loss, t+1) 0.163 
(1.918)* 
Board Reputation 0.078 
(3.002)*** 
Board Reputation*D(Loss,t) -0.033 
(-1.271) 
Board Reputation*D(Loss,t+1) 0.055 
(2.116)** 
D(Loss, t) 0.246 0.219 0.440 
(4.064)*** (3.672)*** (2.688)*** 
D(Loss, t+1) 0.087 0.098 -0.121 
(1.419) (1.634) (-0.731) 
Tenure 0.012 0.012 0.012 
(4.928)*** (4.928)*** (4.759)*** 
D(Age>69) 0.786 0.785 0.783 
(17.540)*** (17.520)*** (17.484)*** 
Board Size 2.229 2.228 2.221 
(13.259)*** (13.250)*** (13.123)*** 
Observations 99,795 99,795 99,795 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm 
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Table 3: Performance and Reason for Departure - Univariate Analysis 
 
Panel A tabulates performance measures by departure reasons. Panel B and Panel C tabulate performance measures by verifiability of the stated departure 
reasons. We read 8-K filings to determine verifiability and creditability of the stated departure reasons. Examples are provided in Appendix A. All the variables 
are defined under Table 1. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Personal category in Panel A, B and C includes stated 
departure reasons citing health, personal reasons and retirement. Partitioning of stated departure reasons into ‘Verifiable’ and ‘Non-verifiable’ for 1,377 cases in 
Personal category, produces 1,172 cases classified as ‘Verifiable’ (retirement at age of 69, Mandatory retirement and health reasons) and the remaining 205 
classified as ‘Non-verifiable’. 11 cases in Outside Commitment category are verifiable, where details about outside commitments are provided. 
 
 
Panel A Performance by Departure Reasons 
 Disagreement Investigation No Reason 
Outside  
Commitments Personal  
Number of Obs 84 5 3,487 694 1,377  
CAR[-360,-5] 0.081 -0.326 -0.082*** -0.101*** -0.026  
CAR[-4,1] -0.023*** -0.029** -0.007*** -0.009*** 0.005  
CAR[2,360] 0.061 0.266 -0.073*** -0.108*** -0.022  
Excess past profitability -0.130*** -0.247 -0.081*** -0.046*** -0.002  
Excess future profitability -0.128*** 0.041 -0.078*** -0.060*** -0.006*  
Excess past cash flow -0.020 -0.059 -0.017*** 0.011** 0.005  
Excess future cash flow -0.085* 0.023 -0.016** -0.019 -0.001  
       
Panel B Verifiable vs. Non-verifiable Departure 
 All Sample Verifiable Non-verifiable 
 N % N % N % 
Disagreement 84 1.49 84 6.60 0 0.00 
Investigation 5 0.09 5 0.39 0 0.00 
No Reason 3,487 61.75 0 0.00 3,487 79.70 
Outside Commitments 694 12.29 11 0.86 683 15.61 
Personal (Personal/Retirement/Health) 1,377 24.38 1,172 92.14 205 4.69 
Total 5,647 100 1,272 100 4,375 100.00 
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Panel C Performance by Verifiable vs. Non-verifiable Departure 
 
1. Verifiable-Neutral 
(Personal, Retirement, 
Health, Commitments)  
2. Verifiable-Negative 
(Disagreement, 
Investigation)  
3. Non-verifiable 
(No Reason, 
Commitments, Personal)  
Test of 
diff.  
between 
1 and 2 
Test of 
diff.  
between 
1 and 3 
Test of 
diff.  
between 
2 and 3 
 N Mean  N Mean  N Mean  P value P value P value 
CAR[-360,-5] 1,183 -0.039  89 0.058  4,375 -0.079***  0.325 0.089 0.205 
CAR[-4,1] 1,183 0.005  89 -0.023***  4,375 -0.007***  0.038 0.001 0.136 
CAR[2,360] 1,183 -0.004  89 0.073  4,375 -0.081***  0.376 0.004 0.073 
Excess past profitability 1,130 -0.001  89 -0.134***  4,325 -0.081***  0.000 0.000 0.113 
Excess future profitability 1,047 -0.005  76 -0.119***  3,817 -0.072***  0.000 0.000 0.135 
Excess past cash flow 1,166 0.002  89 -0.022  4,302 -0.011***  0.1213 0.009 0.495 
Excess future cash flow 1,074 -0.005   76 -0.074   3,850 -0.015***   0.004 0.161 0.023 
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Table 4: Performance and Reason for Departure - Multivariate Analysis 
 
The table reports regression results of returns around the resignation date (Columns 1, 3) and in the year following 
the resignation (Columns 2, 4) on the resignation categories and other controls. Log ROA is the natural log of 1+ 
ROA. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are 
clustered at firm level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed significance level at 
10%, 5% and 1% level.  
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CAR[-4,1] CAR[2,360] CAR[-4,1] CAR[2,360] 
          
D(Disagreement/Inv) -0.024 0.089 
(-2.293)** (0.965) 
D(No Reason) -0.012 -0.038 
(-2.276)** (-1.203) 
D(Commitment) -0.014 -0.075 
(-2.487)** (-1.705)* 
D(Personal) -0.004 -0.127 
(-0.503) (-1.989)** 
D(Verifiable-Negative) -0.024 0.100 
(-2.276)** (1.061) 
D(Non-Verifiable) -0.012 -0.057 
(-2.307)** (-1.853)* 
Tenure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(2.265)** (0.177) (2.367)** (0.279) 
Log Dir Age -0.005 0.107 -0.005 0.099 
(-0.640) (1.504) (-0.564) (1.408) 
D(Audit) -0.001 0.056 -0.001 0.052 
(-0.307) (1.879)* (-0.312) (1.765)* 
D(Nomination) -0.008 -0.094 -0.008 -0.098 
(-1.558) (-2.886)*** (-1.575) (-2.919)*** 
D(Compensation) 0.013 0.099 0.013 0.092 
(1.870)* (3.040)*** (1.869)* (2.760)*** 
D(Multi Departure) -0.011 -0.046 -0.011 -0.042 
(-1.387) (-1.272) (-1.343) (-1.193) 
D(Appoint Exe) 0.005 0.027 0.005 0.032 
(0.750) (0.587) (0.766) (0.698) 
D(Appoint Indep Dir) 0.013 -0.014 0.013 -0.016 
(2.760)*** (-0.536) (2.817)*** (-0.615) 
D(CEO-Chair) 0.005 -0.002 0.005 0.002 
(1.609) (-0.064) (1.652)* (0.058) 
Board Size -0.000 0.010 -0.000 0.010 
(-0.434) (1.912)* (-0.399) (1.986)** 
Independent directorships 0.002 0.026 0.002 0.028 
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(1.350) (2.215)** (1.317) (2.346)** 
Analyst Coverage 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
(0.421) (-0.145) (0.409) (-0.047) 
D(Board Busy) 0.004 0.082 0.005 0.070 
(0.858) (1.575) (0.919) (1.366) 
Log Firm Age 0.000 0.047 -0.000 0.048 
(0.021) (2.612)*** (-0.011) (2.695)*** 
Log Asset 0.001 -0.011 0.001 -0.014 
(0.921) (-1.085) (0.918) (-1.403) 
Log ROA 0.006 0.040 0.006 0.038 
(0.664) (0.751) (0.670) (0.716) 
D(Delaware) -0.002 0.044 -0.002 0.044 
(-0.482) (1.632) (-0.466) (1.622) 
Constant 0.012 -0.649 0.009 -0.585 
(0.320) (-2.212)** (0.237) (-1.994)** 
Observations 5,647 5,647 5,647 5,647 
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.021 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm 
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Table 5: Moderating Signals 
 
The table reports regression results of returns around the resignation date on the resignation categories, controlling 
for current period operating performance (Columns 1, 3) and information environment (Columns 2, 4). All variables 
are defined in previous tables. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at firm level. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CAR[-4,1] CAR[-4,1] CAR[-4,1] CAR[-4,1] 
      
D(Disagreement/Inv) -0.021 -0.030 
(-2.052)** (-2.259)** 
D(No Reason) -0.010 -0.020 
(-2.105)** (-2.503)** 
D(Commitment) -0.013 -0.019 
(-2.328)** (-2.236)** 
D(Personal) -0.002 -0.013 
(-0.263) (-1.158) 
D(Disagreement/Inv)*Log ROA 0.045 
(1.690)* 
D(No Reason)*Log ROA 0.040 
(1.830)* 
D(Commitment)*Log ROA 0.039 
(1.849)* 
D(Personal)*Log ROA -0.032 
(-0.571) 
D(Disagreement/Inv)*Analyst Coverage 0.001 
(0.755) 
D(No Reason)*Analyst Coverage 0.001 
(2.458)** 
D(Commitment)*Analyst Coverage 0.001 
(1.351) 
D(Personal)*Analyst Coverage 0.001 
(1.830)* 
D(Verifiable-Negative) -0.021 -0.030 
(-2.044)** (-2.247)** 
D(Non-Verifiable) -0.010 -0.019 
(-2.153)** (-2.502)** 
D(Verifiable-Negative)*Log ROA 0.045 
(1.687)* 
D(Non-Verifiable)*Log ROA 0.039 
(1.894)* 
D(Verifiable-Negative)*Analyst Coverage 0.001 
(0.756) 
D(Non-Verifiable)*Analyst Coverage 0.001 
(2.420)** 
Tenure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(2.314)** (2.275)** (2.417)** (2.382)** 
Log Dir Age -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 
(-0.540) (-0.656) (-0.493) (-0.587) 
D(Audit) -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
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(-0.403) (-0.302) (-0.395) (-0.295) 
D(Nomination) -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
(-1.555) (-1.540) (-1.541) (-1.562) 
D(Compensation) 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
(1.863)* (1.866)* (1.871)* (1.859)* 
D(Multi Departure) -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
(-1.382) (-1.299) (-1.339) (-1.253) 
D(Appoint Exe) 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 
(0.811) (0.756) (0.838) (0.780) 
D(Appoint Indep Dir) 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
(2.768)*** (2.787)*** (2.817)*** (2.843)*** 
D(CEO-Chair) 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
(1.579) (1.649)* (1.631) (1.669)* 
Board Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.375) (-0.326) (-0.337) (-0.296) 
Independent directorships 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(1.395) (1.368) (1.396) (1.324) 
D(Board Busy) 0.005 0.005 0.000 -0.001 
(1.038) (0.950) (0.422) (-1.855)* 
Analyst Coverage 0.000 -0.001 0.005 0.006 
(0.478) (-1.832)* (1.014) (1.075) 
Log Firm Age 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
(0.036) (0.063) (-0.027) (0.025) 
Log Asset 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.815) (0.886) (0.830) (0.886) 
Log ROA -0.025 0.006 -0.025 0.006 
(-1.576) (0.648) (-1.580) (0.658) 
D(Delaware) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(-0.485) (-0.471) (-0.474) (-0.456) 
Constant 0.007 0.017 0.005 0.014 
(0.198) (0.458) (0.143) (0.388) 
Observations 5,647 5,647 5,647 5,647 
R-squared 0.015 0.013 0.014 0.013 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm 
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Table 6: Analyst Forecast Revisions 
 
The table reports results of an analysis of analysts’ reaction to director resignation and the reason provided. Analyst forecasts are from I/B/E/S. To be included in 
the revision sample, we require an analyst to have at least one forecast prior to filing and one revision within 6 calendar days of filing, relating to the same fiscal 
year end. Panel A tabulates sample statistics for the revision sample. The ‘Total’ line provides the sum or the average of the statistic. Panel B splits the sample 
statistics by verifiability of the stated departure reasons. Panel C reports regression analysis by stated resignation reason (column 1) and verifiability (column 2) . 
‘Change in forecast’ is the ratio of the change in the forecast (new forecast minus previous forecast) to the absolute value of the previous forecast All other 
variables are defined under Table 1. Constants are included but not displayed. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at firm level. 
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
Panel A Analyst Revision Sample 
No of  
Resignations 
 in full sample 
No of 
resignations at 
firms covered 
by IBES 
No of resignations 
resulting in a 
forecast revision 
Avg 
Analyst 
coverage 
Total No of 
revisions 
% of analysts 
that revise 
Change 
in 
Forecast t-stat p 
Disagreement/Investigation 89 52 8 8.10 26 40% -0.112 -1.762 0.116 
No Reasons 3,487 2,348 602 9.25 1722 31% -0.212 -5.584 0.000 
Outside Commitments 694 490 144 9.92 550 39% -0.532 -3.501 0.001 
Personal  1,377 975 272 10.07 752 27% -0.007 -0.972 0.332 
Total 5647 3865 1026 9.52 3050 31% -0.222 -6.582 0.000 
 
Panel B Verifiable Vs Non-verifiable 
  
No of resignations 
resulting in a 
forecast revision 
Avg 
Analyst 
coverage 
Total No of 
revisions 
% of analyst 
that revise 
Change 
in 
Forecast t-stat p 
Non-verifiable Departure 
No Reasons 602 9.25 1722 31% -0.212 -5.584 0.000 
Outside Commitments 143 9.94 549 39% -0.535 -3.501 0.001 
Personal  37 8.85 70 21% -0.074 -1.612 0.115 
        
Verifiable Departure-Negative 
Disagreement/Investigation 8 8.10 26 40% -0.112 -1.762 0.116 
Verifiable Departure-Neutral 
Outside Commitments 1 8.29 1 12% -0.018 na na 
Personal  235 10.28 682 28% 0.003 0.213 0.832 
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Table 6: Analyst Forecast Revisions Continued 
 
Panel C Regression Analysis 
 (1) (2) 
  Change in Forecast Change in Forecast 
D(Disagreement/Inv) 0.104 
(0.630) 
D(No Reason) -0.162 
(-2.398)** 
D(Commitment) -0.454 
(-3.183)*** 
D(Personal) -0.112 
(-1.659)* 
D(Verifiable-Negative) 0.120 
(0.707) 
D(Non-Verifiable) -0.199 
(-3.388)*** 
Tenure -0.001 0.001 
(-0.279) (0.141) 
Log Dir Age 0.101 0.163 
(0.329) (0.519) 
D(Audit) 0.066 0.094 
(0.930) (1.304) 
D(Nomination) 0.139 0.145 
(1.534) (1.621) 
D(Compensation) 0.126 0.104 
(1.250) (1.094) 
D(Multi Departure) -0.025 0.011 
(-0.283) (0.120) 
D(Appoint Exe) 0.037 0.055 
(0.501) (0.742) 
D(Appoint Indep Dir) 0.128 0.147 
(1.809)* (2.126)** 
D(CEO-Chair) -0.008 -0.009 
(-0.106) (-0.117) 
Board Size 0.001 0.002 
(0.046) (0.125) 
Independent directorships -0.039 -0.045 
(-1.346) (-1.635) 
Analyst Coverage 0.010 0.010 
(1.992)** (1.966)** 
D(Board Busy) 0.098 0.130 
(1.451) (1.908)* 
Log Firm Age 0.139 0.129 
(2.506)** (2.360)** 
Log Asset -0.053 -0.055 
(-1.682)* (-1.735)* 
Log ROA 0.086 0.085 
(0.792) (0.767) 
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D(Delaware) -0.025 -0.014 
(-0.338) (-0.191) 
Constant -0.397 -0.661 
(-0.322) (-0.526) 
Observations 1,026 1,026 
R-squared 0.072 0.064 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm 
 
